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OPINION  
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ronald Ottaviano appeals his judgment of conviction 
for mail and wire fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, and 
conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service. 
Ottaviano raises various constitutional and legal challenges to 
the conduct of his trial. Because we are unpersuaded that the 
District Court committed reversible error, we will affirm.  
I 
 Ottaviano is one of those peculiar Americans who does 
not believe himself bound by United States tax law. Not 
content to subject only himself to the penalties that flow 
inevitably from this belief, Ottaviano marketed his views to 
others for his own financial gain. Through his company, Mid-
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Atlantic Trusts and Administrators, Ottaviano offered 
financial products he claimed would help others elude the IRS 
and have the government pay their debts. 
 Mid-Atlantic‘s principal offering was the ―Pure Trust 
Organization‖ (PTO), which Ottaviano marketed as a means 
to hide assets from creditors and the IRS. Although PTOs 
appeared to be legitimate trusts for which Ottaviano and his 
company would act as trustees, in actuality customers had 
unlimited access to and control over the accounts—which 
made them sham trusts. Mid-Atlantic charged customers 
$3,000 to start a PTO, after which the company would open a 
bank account for the customer, often using a false employer 
identification number and representing that someone other 
than the customer had ―created‖ the PTO or exchanged assets 
into it. Mid-Atlantic would then give the customer a debit 
card, checkbooks, and the online account password, as well as 
stamps bearing the trustees‘ signatures, giving customers full 
control of the assets.  
 To maintain the appearance of propriety, PTO 
customers‘ bank statements were mailed to Ottaviano‘s home 
before he forwarded them to customers. Mid-Atlantic also 
gave customers an elaborate binder of ―trust documents‖ with 
an ―official‖ section in the front and secret instructions in the 
back, behind a page prominently labeled ―KEEP THIS 
MANUAL PRIVATE.‖ This section explained that customers 
could access money in the account whenever and however 
they wanted as long as they made it appear as if the trustees 
were making the decisions.  
 Ottaviano posted false testimonials on Mid-Atlantic‘s 
website and referred to them in a podcast to reassure 
customers about PTOs. He also claimed the PTOs had 
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experienced ―just three challenges, but . . . stood up each 
time,‖ despite knowing that the IRS considered them a sham. 
 In 2007, after attending a seminar hosted by a well-
known tax protestor, Ottaviano and his business partner also 
began offering a debt-elimination plan called ―Beneficiaries 
in Common‖ (BIC). Inspired by ―redemption theory,‖ which 
posits that the Uniform Commercial Code can be used to 
access secret bank accounts maintained by the government in 
every citizen‘s name, Ottaviano marketed BIC using an 
elaborate story: When the United States abandoned the gold 
standard in 1933, the country went bankrupt and the citizenry 
became debtors. At that point, the U.S. Treasury created 
secret accounts for each citizen, tied to Social Security 
numbers or birth certificates. By filing certain documents 
with the federal and state governments, a citizen could access 
his account and transform himself from debtor to creditor, 
forcing the U.S. Treasury to take out millions of dollars and 
pay off customers‘ ―public debts,‖ such as mortgages, credit 
cards, taxes, and criminal fines and penalties.  
 As far-fetched as this sounds, unscrupulous and/or 
credulous souls paid Mid-Atlantic $3,500 each ($5,000 if 
purchased jointly) to participate. Ottaviano bolstered his sales 
pitch by falsely claiming that customers had successfully 
satisfied mortgages using BIC, that he had successfully used 
both BIC and PTOs to eliminate his own tax liability and 
discharge his own debt, and that the Treasury Department had 
assured him BIC was legitimate. Ottaviano also 
misrepresented to customers that he had graduated from 
college and law school, was a certified financial planner and 
certified to represent taxpayers before the IRS, and was 
backed by a staff of certified public accountants. In truth, 
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Ottaviano had never even attended college, notwithstanding 
the fake Villanova University diploma displayed in his office.  
 After customers bought into BIC, Ottaviano would 
guide them through a lengthy process. First, Mid-Atlantic 
provided a $300 million ―indemnity bond‖ for the customer to 
submit to the Secretary of the Treasury. According to 
Ottaviano, if the Secretary did not reject the bond in 15 days, 
it was accepted, and the Secretary had to open an account in 
the customer‘s name. Next, the customer ―funded‖ the new 
account by submitting a $50 million, Mid-Atlantic-supplied 
bond to the Treasury, supposedly to authorize the government 
and customer to each spend up to $25 million. After enough 
time passed for the bond to be ―processed,‖ the customer 
would be ―bonded‖ and could use Mid-Atlantic-supplied 
promissory notes against the $25 million. The initial BIC fee 
included two promissory notes. Additional notes cost $500 
each. Mid-Atlantic began sending the U.S. Treasury 
thousands of ―bonds‖ on behalf of hundreds of customers.  
 Unsurprisingly, BIC was not effective. Customers who 
tried to use it to satisfy debts received predictable responses 
from financial institutions and from the government warning 
them that BIC was a fraud and that the so-called bonds were 
worthless. Ottaviano received numerous emails informing 
him that BIC was likely illegal, yet continued to sell it to new 
customers. Meanwhile, the Mid-Atlantic offices and staff 
were flooded with phone calls, letters, faxes, and email from 
frustrated customers. 
 Ottaviano‘s scheme began to unravel in early 2008, 
when a customer warned Mid-Atlantic office manager Susan 
McDermott that BIC might be an illegal scam. McDermott 
and a coworker followed up by searching for more 
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information online and shared what they learned with other 
colleagues, as well as with Ottaviano and his wife. Soon 
thereafter, McDermott and the coworker quit their jobs and 
reported Ottaviano‘s activities to authorities.  
 The IRS Criminal Investigation Division had also been 
probing Ottaviano‘s business dealings and in the fall of 2008 
executed search warrants at his home, a mailbox, and Mid-
Atlantic‘s office, seizing computers and documents. This and 
later searches unearthed a wealth of evidence, including 
additional customer complaints and notices from banks and 
other companies warning that BIC notes and bonds were 
―irrelevant gibberish‖ and ―frivolous.‖ Even after the 
warrants were served, however, Ottaviano continued to 
promote BIC and PTOs, including to an undercover agent 
posing as a prospective customer. Among other things, 
Ottaviano told the agent how a customer could really control 
the PTO, although ―the way it‘s set up, and the way all the 
documents are, nobody could ever prove that.‖ 
 In 2010, Ottaviano was charged with one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 
371, eight counts of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1341 and 1343, one count of money laundering under 18 
U.S.C. § 1957, and two counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 51. The indictment also sought forfeiture of both the fees 
Mid-Atlantic received from 2005 to July 2010 and the 
Delaware beach house that Ottaviano bought using some of 
the proceeds.  
 A jury trial began in May 2011 before Judge William 
J. Martini of the District of New Jersey. Ottaviano was tried 
with four codefendants, all of whom were represented by 
counsel. Ottaviano opted to represent himself, with court-
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appointed standby counsel available to serve as a resource. At 
trial, the Government presented extensive documentary 
evidence detailing Ottaviano‘s role as the architect of the 
scheme, as well as testimony from seven IRS representatives, 
three former employees (including his former office manager, 
Susan McDermott), four BIC customers who described their 
negative experiences, and two Ottaviano acquaintances who 
debunked testimonials Ottaviano had falsely attributed to 
them.  
 To further undermine Ottaviano‘s defense that he had 
acted out of a good-faith belief that PTOs and BIC were 
valid, prosecutors presented evidence showing that he had 
attempted to hide Mid-Atlantic‘s activities by installing its 
real computer server in a crawl space above the company‘s 
office while placing a dummy server downstairs. The 
Government also introduced recordings of Ottaviano 
promoting PTOs and BIC between 2007 and 2009, as well as 
Ottaviano‘s conversations with the undercover agent, his 
meetings with the IRS, and jailhouse calls to his wife.  
 Initially, the trial proceeded without incident, even 
with Ottaviano representing himself, and the transcript 
indicates that Judge Martini acted as a neutral, patient, and 
accommodating arbiter. After the Government rested, 
Ottaviano mounted his defense. He ultimately called thirteen 
witnesses, but had difficulty getting them to appear on the 
right day and time. With the trial approaching a fourth week, 
Judge Martini‘s patience began to wear thin. Despite 
Ottaviano‘s promise to show that some BIC instruments 
worked, his witnesses testified only that Ottaviano had not 
guaranteed them BIC would work, and no one testified that 
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BIC had satisfied their debts.
1
 At various points during 
defense witnesses‘ direct and cross-examinations, Judge 
Martini chimed in with skeptical questions that apparently 
stemmed from a desire to clarify rambling or nonsensical 
testimony.  
The District Court‘s most significant intervention 
occurred when Ottaviano took the stand in his own defense. 
As standby counsel read questions from a script Ottaviano 
had written, the District Court interjected early and often. The 
judge‘s first question came on the second page of Ottaviano‘s 
testimony, in a preliminary part of the direct examination 
where Ottaviano was explaining his work history. ―Wait,‖ the 
Court interjected. ―That‘s why you put down you were a 
college graduate on a resume when you weren‘t. Correct?‖ 
―Yes,‖ Ottaviano replied, and the testimony continued.  
About twenty pages into the direct examination, 
Ottaviano began to describe how he sent a letter to the 
Treasury Secretary about BIC. Standby counsel attempted to 
introduce the letter, at which point the Government said it did 
not have a copy. The jury was excused, and the Court ordered 
Ottaviano out of the courtroom so the judge and lawyers 
could discuss the letter‘s origins. Ottaviano was absent for 
about five pages of transcript, during which time an attorney 
for another defendant observed: ―This may be none of my 
business but just a caution: He‘s pro se and we‘re arguing 
legal issues.‖ Judge Martini replied that standby counsel was 
present and that he wanted Ottaviano outside the courtroom 
                                                 
1
 One witness testified that BIC had paid off some of 
his outstanding taxes, but on cross-examination he conceded 
that he had no proof of that and still owed the IRS $73,000 
and had a lien on his house. 
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for a reason. Ottaviano returned shortly thereafter, and he, the 
judge, and the attorneys continued to discuss the letter outside 
the presence of the jury. The judge decided to admit the letter, 
at which point the jury returned and the direct examination 
continued.  
Soon after the letter was admitted into evidence, the 
Court began asking Ottaviano skeptical questions about it. 
After Ottaviano testified that he had never filed a tax return 
and that he did not believe in federal income tax liability, the 
judge reminded the jury that the Court would provide them 
with the law on income tax obligations, regardless of other 
people‘s opinions. The direct examination then concluded 
with little interruption, with the District Court giving 
Ottaviano fairly wide latitude to explain the basis for his 
beliefs and the financial products he offered.  
On cross-examination, Ottaviano was a difficult 
witness. He claimed that a tax case against his business 
partner had been dismissed, which prompted the District 
Court to interrupt the prosecutor‘s line of questioning. The 
Court argued with Ottaviano about how the case had actually 
been resolved until the prosecutor offered into evidence a 
certified copy of the judgment. Soon thereafter, prosecutors 
impeached Ottaviano on false representations he had made 
about having a college degree and law degree. After 
prosecutors introduced evidence that Ottaviano had 
withdrawn from an online law school in 2006, the District 
Court also questioned him about his fake Villanova diploma, 
before the prosecutor had a chance to do so. This prompted 
the Assistant U.S. Attorney to state: ―Your Honor, you 
anticipated my next question.‖  
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After prosecutors concluded their questioning, which 
had laid bare Ottaviano‘s scheme, the Court followed up with 
leading questions of its own about how Ottaviano‘s phony 
educational credentials would have helped him sell his 
financial products. After a brief cross-examination by counsel 
for a co-defendant, Ottaviano‘s standby counsel conducted a 
redirect, during which the Court again began asking skeptical 
questions, this time about BIC and other people‘s obligations 
to pay their mortgages. The Court also asked Ottaviano to 
characterize other witnesses‘ testimony, questioned why 
Ottaviano had not produced witnesses who had said BIC 
worked, and opined: ―But when I asked you did it work, 
candidly you‘ve answered no.‖  
Standby counsel then tried to rehabilitate Ottaviano by 
asking him to explain why he had claimed to have a law 
degree. He started to answer when the District Court 
intervened again: 
THE COURT: Whoa, whoa, whoa. Did you 
ever hear of earning a—earning credits so that 
you could apply, having achieved grades and 
gone to school and get marks, and then apply to 
law school? Did you ever hear that? 
OTTAVIANO: Oh, sure. 
THE COURT: Did you ever realize there are 
people that do that— 
OTTAVIANO: Yes. 
THE COURT: —and they work hard— 
OTTAVIANO: Yes. 
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THE COURT: —and then they apply to law 
school? 
OTTAVIANO: Yes. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Did you 
ever think that it was okay to earn money based 
on a similar premise you‘re articulating? 
OTTAVIANO: No, I wouldn‘t think so. 
THE COURT: Wouldn‘t think so? . . . But it‘s 
okay to give law school [sic] your false 
transcript and to get a degree based on 
something that was fraudulent or false? That‘s 
okay? 
This line of questioning continued until Ottaviano‘s 
standby counsel surrendered by remarking: ―I have 
nothing further, Judge.‖ All told, Ottaviano‘s 
testimony covered 140 pages of a trial transcript that 
spanned 3,300 pages.  
After Ottaviano stepped down, the District Court 
offered a cautionary instruction explaining that the Court had 
a right to ask questions of a witness, ―particularly if there‘s 
ambiguity in the Court‘s opinion, if I think there‘s an area 
that would assist us in all understanding something better, if I 
believe that there‘s an area that could be elaborated on more 
to get to the truthfulness of what it is.‖ The judge told the jury 
they should not give his questions more weight than anyone 
else‘s.  
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Afterward, other witnesses testified, and the Court 
adjourned for the day. Neither Ottaviano nor his standby 
counsel offered any objection to the Court‘s questioning at 
any point that day, although there were two separate breaks 
that offered an opportunity to do so outside the presence of 
the jury. Ottaviano did, however, move for a mistrial first 
thing the next morning on the grounds that he had been 
―unduly prejudiced in front of the jury‖: 
OTTAVIANO: When I stipulated to the fake 
diploma, I did that based on the fact that I lied 
and I wanted to lessen the impact of it, and 
when I was cross-examined by your Honor and 
hammered on that issue— 
THE COURT: I didn‘t, Mr. Ottaviano. The 
transcript will speak for itself. Don‘t 
characterize it as hammering. I have a right to 
ask you questions, particularly, and I‘ll tell you 
why in a minute. But let me hear your position.  
Ottaviano then stated that he would not have testified 
had he known he would face such cross-examination on his 
false educational credentials. He insisted further that the 
District Court‘s cross-examination ―basically told the jury 
that I defrauded the law school, which means the jury 
believes whatever the judge says . . . [so] they‘re going to 
take the fact that I defrauded my clients and the government 
as well.‖  
The Government responded that Ottaviano had opened 
the door to cross-examination about the fake diploma and that 
the limiting instruction cured any potential prejudice 
stemming from the Court‘s questions. Judge Martini then 
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explained his actions, saying that he was ―a little befuddled 
by [Ottaviano‘s] cavalier attitude that it was okay to [claim 
false educational credentials].‖ ―Quite frankly, I thought it 
was appropriate to ask questions as to why you thought this 
was okay,‖ Judge Martini said. ―To the extent that [the jury] 
heard it from me, they would have heard it from the 
Government, probably, in the same way.‖ He then denied the 
motion for a mistrial, saying that the record would speak for 
itself and that there was no prejudice. 
The jury deliberated about four and a half hours before 
finding Ottaviano guilty on all counts. On December 16, 
2011, the District Court sentenced Ottaviano to 62 months in 
prison. Because the Government took longer than expected to 
compile restitution information and because Ottaviano had 
not fully disclosed his assets, the final restitution order was 
delayed. On January 8, 2013, the District Court ordered 
Ottaviano to pay $1,520,553.70 in restitution.
2
 This timely 
appeal followed. 
II 
 Ottaviano raises four issues on appeal, only one of 
which is worthy of extensive analysis. In that claim, 
Ottaviano argues that the District Court denied him a fair trial 
in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process of 
law when it cross-examined him.
3
  
                                                 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
3
 Ottaviano‘s brief also takes issue with the Court‘s 
questioning of defense witnesses as well, but counsel 
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A 
As a threshold matter, we must determine the correct 
standard of review. Federal Rule of Evidence 614(c) provides 
that ―[a] party may object to the court‘s calling or examining 
a witness either at that time or at the next opportunity when 
the jury is not present.‖ Here, Ottaviano did not strictly 
comply with that rule because he did not object during the 
questioning or at the next opportunity when the jury was not 
present, or the next opportunity after that. Consequently, the 
Government urges us to review this claim for plain error.  
Although this is a close call, Ottaviano‘s pro se status, 
combined with the fact that he moved for a mistrial at the 
outset of the next day‘s business, counsel in favor of holding 
that he preserved that issue for appeal. See United States v. 
Evans, 994 F.2d 317, 323 (7th Cir. 1993) (Rule 614 objection 
preserved for appeal when defense counsel made a motion for 
mistrial as the first order of business the following day); see 
also Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153–54 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(―[W]e have traditionally given pro se litigants greater leeway 
where they have not followed the technical rules of pleading 
and procedure.‖). Accordingly, we shall review the denial of 
his motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion, focusing on 
whether any conduct at trial was so prejudicial that the 
defendant was deprived of a fundamental right—in this case, 
the right to a fair trial. See United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 
                                                                                                             
acknowledged at oral argument that that issue is not before us 
on appeal. Oral Argument Recording at 34:25.  
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1281, 1285 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 
1090, 1093 (3d Cir. 1983).  
B 
Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b) allows judges to 
question witnesses and act as more than ―a mere moderator.‖ 
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). But a 
judge must not ―abandon his [or her] proper role and assume 
that of an advocate.‖ United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 
342 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Green, 544 F.2d 
138, 147 (3d Cir. 1976)). ―[I]solated questioning to clarify 
ambiguities is one thing,‖ but ―a trial judge cannot . . . take 
over the cross-examination for the government to merely 
emphasize the government‘s proof or question the credibility 
of the defendant and his witnesses.‖ Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1095 
(quotation omitted). ―The judge‘s participation must never 
reach the point where ‗it appears clear to the jury that the 
court believes the accused is guilty.‘‖ Id. at 1093 (quoting 
United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
Judges must be especially careful about their conduct 
during trial because they hold a position of special authority 
and credibility in the eyes of the jury. Thus, ―cross-
examination of a witness by the trial judge is potentially more 
impeaching than such an examination conducted by an 
adversary attorney‖ and can prove fatal to a witness‘s 
credibility, particularly if that witness is the defendant. United 
States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 678 (4th Cir. 2001). ―Even 
when the evidence provides the court with a negative 
impression of the defendant,‖ as was the case here, ―the judge 
must refrain from interjecting that perception into the trial.‖ 
Id. See Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1094 (observing that ―a jury might 
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think that a witness would be more likely to tell the truth to 
the judge than to counsel‖).  
In Beaty, we found error in the judge‘s ―overzealous‖ 
and ―lengthy cross-examination‖ of a key defense witness, 
which spanned four pages in the trial transcript. 722 F.2d at 
1096. We noted that judges should minimize their own 
questioning during trial, ―to the end that any such judicial 
departure from the normal course of trial be merely helpful in 
clarifying testimony rather than prejudicial in tending to 
impose upon the jury what the judge seems to think about the 
evidence.‖ Id. at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also United States v. Wilensky, 757 F.2d 594, 597–98 (3d Cir. 
1985) (holding that trial judge‘s interruptions and extensive 
examination during both direct and cross-examination of a 
key defense witness ―overstep[ped] the bounds of prudent 
judicial conduct‖).  
  In this case, the District Court erred in questioning 
Ottaviano. It skeptically questioned him at length during his 
direct examination and, after the Government completed its 
thorough cross-examination, ―follow[ed] up‖ on prosecutors‘ 
questions about Ottaviano‘s fake educational credentials with 
a barrage of its own. On redirect, the Court repeatedly 
interrupted again, challenging Ottaviano about his assertions 
and his witnesses‘ testimony. Then, at the end of redirect, the 
judge renewed his indignation about Ottaviano‘s false 
educational credentials, prodding him for approximately five 
pages of the trial transcript and inviting him to speculate on 
the ultimate issue in the case.  
The Government attempts to downplay the District 
Court‘s incursions. While it is easy to see how Ottaviano‘s 
testimony would have tested even the most patient jurist, that 
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is no excuse for a judge to ―abandon his . . . proper role and 
assume that of an advocate.‖ Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 342 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
Although some of Ottaviano‘s testimony was 
confusing, both his standby counsel and the prosecutors were 
capable of clarifying it without the Court‘s intervention. 
Moreover, in both tone and content, the worst of the District 
Court‘s questions went beyond mere clarification to become 
cross-examination. In the transcript, the Court appears highly 
dubious of Ottaviano‘s defense. As justifiable as that 
sentiment was, however, it should not have been conveyed to 
the jury. Because the District Court violated this imperative, 
we hold that its questioning of Ottaviano was improper.  
C 
Having found error, we turn to the question of remedy. 
As Ottaviano‘s able counsel acknowledged at oral argument, 
improper judicial questioning is not structural error, the very 
existence of which renders a trial fundamentally unfair. See 
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) 
(noting that ―only . . . certain structural errors undermining 
the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole . . .  require[] 
reversal without regard to the mistake‘s effect on the 
proceeding.‖). Thus, the verdict must stand if the error did not 
deprive Ottaviano of a fair trial. Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1092; see 
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953) (―A 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.‖). 
―[N]o absolute, rigid rule exists‖ in making this 
determination. Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1093. Rather, ―a balancing 
process must be employed to determine whether the trial 
judge‘s comments have pervaded the overall fairness of the 
proceeding.‖ Wilensky, 757 F.2d at 598. We must examine 
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the trial record as a whole to determine whether the error 
prejudiced the defendant. Id. An error is harmless if it is 
―highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.‖ United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 540 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 
172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
 Some of the factors we have considered in determining 
whether to reverse for improper judicial questioning include: 
the portion of the trial record affected, whether the jury was 
present, whether the judge appeared to treat both sides 
evenhandedly, whether curative instructions were provided, 
the extent to which the judge betrayed bias or cast doubt on 
the witness‘s credibility, and other evidence of the 
defendant‘s guilt. Wilensky, 757 F.2d at 598; Beaty, 722 F.2d 
at 1093–94, 1097.  
The few Third Circuit cases on this subject are not 
clearly analogous to Ottaviano‘s case. In Beaty, for example, 
we reversed one defendant‘s conviction but upheld another 
following claims of improper judicial questioning of 
witnesses. 722 F.3d at 1092–97. The Government presented 
extensive evidence in a two-week trial against Beaty, the 
defendant whose conviction was affirmed, and we held that 
the judge‘s ―few . . . intemperate remarks‖ during the cross-
examination of a prosecution witness were insufficient to 
prejudice the defendant given the ―length of the trial and the 
overwhelming evidence of [the defendant‘s] guilt.‖ Id. at 
1095. 
In the same decision, however, we reversed the 
conviction of Beaty‘s codefendant after the judge peppered 
his key witness with questions ―completely unrelated to the 
offenses with which [defendant] was charged, the alibi which 
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[defendant] offered, and the substance of [the witness‘s] 
testimony.‖ Id. at 1095. This was of crucial importance 
because the Government had little other evidence against the 
defendant and even admitted in its closing argument that if 
jurors believed the witness, the defendant‘s conviction could 
not be sustained. Id. at 1095–96. In this context, we found the 
judge‘s questioning sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 
reversal. Id. at 1096. See also Wilensky, 757 F.2d at 597–98 
(affirming defendant‘s conviction under harmless error 
analysis following judge‘s extensive interjections during key 
witness‘s testimony, finding that although judge‘s actions 
were error, they did not prejudice the defendant in light of the 
―overwhelming testimony which clearly supported the jury‘s 
verdicts of guilty‖).   
United States v. Godwin, a Fourth Circuit case in 
which two defendants were convicted in connection with a 
pyramid scheme, is more analogous to Ottaviano‘s case. 272 
F.3d at 663. There, the Government presented thirty-two 
witnesses to prove the defendants perpetrated a fraud scheme. 
Id. at 666. As in Ottaviano‘s case, the defendants did not 
directly challenge the essentials of the scheme, but instead 
claimed they had no fraudulent intent and ―focused their 
defense efforts on an attempt to prove good faith.‖ Id. Each 
defendant testified and denied they intended to defraud 
investors. Id. On appeal, one defendant claimed that the judge 
cross-examined her at length, interrupting both direct and 
cross-examination. Id. at 674.  
The Fourth Circuit noted that although the judge‘s 
questions and interruptions early in the trial were infrequent 
and permissible, her extensive questioning during the 
defense‘s case was ―skeptic[al],‖ ―overly involved,‖ 
―troublesome,‖ and seemingly ―on, or tending to be on, the 
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side of the Government.‖ Id. at 675, 679, 681. It nevertheless 
declined to overturn the verdict ―[b]ecause of the compelling 
and overwhelming evidence presented against [defendants],‖ 
especially because they had not contested the essential facts 
of the case and, like Ottaviano, ―failed to produce any 
corroborating evidence of good faith.‖ Id. at 680. The panel 
concluded that ―[w]here the evidence is overwhelming and a 
perfect trial would reach the same result, a substantial right is 
not affected.‖ Id. 
In Ottaviano‘s case, the prosecution presented 
overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidence of guilt, 
including damning recordings of him that jurors heard well 
before Ottaviano testified. Ottaviano produced no explanation 
for why Mid-Atlantic‘s server was hidden in the crawl space 
and no witnesses or other evidence to prove that BIC worked. 
Indeed, his witnesses did him no favors. One testified that the 
IRS was not part of the federal government, while another 
claimed to be domiciled in heaven for tax purposes. Once 
Ottaviano testified, near the end of a three-and-a-half-week 
trial, things did not improve. Ottaviano‘s uninterrupted 
explanation of BIC on direct examination was confusing at 
best, and he freely discussed his reasons for believing he was 
not subject to the federal income tax. The Government then 
conducted a devastating cross-examination, during which 
Ottaviano responded argumentatively to questions such as: ―If 
you had sent a letter to [then-Treasury Secretary Henry] 
Paulson asking him whether it was okay for you to pass 
counterfeit 20-dollar bills and he didn‘t respond within your 
30-day deadline, would that silence be acquiescence?‖ In 
response to a prosecutor‘s question, Ottaviano also said that 
one could buy the New York Mets and Yankees five times 
over and use BIC to discharge the debt. All this preceded the 
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most inappropriate judicial questioning, which occurred 
during redirect. 
We also emphasize that the trial transcript in this case 
is roughly 3,300 pages long, and Ottaviano‘s testimony is a 
mere fraction of it: about 140 pages. Although Ottaviano‘s 
testimony was not immaterial, the outcome almost certainly 
did not turn on it, given the amount of other evidence and 
witnesses involved. The rare cases where appellate courts 
have ordered new trials because of improper judicial 
questioning generally have had far less evidence of guilt, 
resulting in a greater likelihood that the judge‘s questioning 
affected the outcome. For instance, in United States v. 
Mazzilli, the Government lacked direct evidence of the 
defendant‘s guilt, which was not the case here. 848 F.2d 384, 
388 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1096 
(―Because the evidence of Ballouz‘s guilt . . . was far from 
overwhelming we cannot conclude that this error did not 
prejudice Ballouz.‖).  
Ottaviano is correct that the Court‘s curative 
instruction did little to blunt the impact of its aggressive 
questioning. See Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1096 (holding that ―the 
damaging impression created by the judge‘s questions‖ was 
not mitigated by subsequent instructions, and that ―such 
admonitions may offset [only] brief or minor departures from 
strict judicial impartiality‖). But that is just one factor we 
must consider. Viewing the trial in its totality, we hold that 
there was such overwhelming evidence of Ottaviano‘s guilt 
that the Court‘s improper questioning was immaterial to the 
jury‘s verdict. 
   
 22 
 
III 
Ottaviano also argues that the District Court violated 
his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when it 
ordered him to leave the courtroom during the discussion 
about his letter to the Treasury Secretary.  
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right to proceed pro se, just as it guarantees the right to 
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820–21 (1975). 
In determining whether a defendant‘s right to represent 
himself has been respected, ―the primary focus must be on 
whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his own 
case in his own way.‖ McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 
177 (1984). The core of this right is the defendant‘s ability 
―to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present 
to the jury.‖ Id. at 178. But appearances also matter: 
―[P]articipation by standby counsel . . . should not be allowed 
to destroy the jury‘s perception that the defendant is 
representing himself.‖ Id. A defendant‘s right to represent 
himself is structural and not amenable to harmless error 
analysis—it is either respected or denied. United States v. 
Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing McKaskle, 
465 U.S. at 177 n.8). Thus, we exercise plenary review over 
this claim. Id. 
 In this case, Ottaviano‘s brief absence from the 
courtroom affected neither his ability to represent himself nor 
the jury‘s perception that he was doing so. The Court made 
no substantive decisions while Ottaviano was out of the 
courtroom, and he invited Ottaviano to return and questioned 
him directly before admitting the letter, as Ottaviano 
requested. Most importantly, the jury was not present during 
any of the events about which Ottaviano complains.  
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Exclusion from a single sidebar conference conducted 
outside the jury‘s presence does not automatically deny one 
the right to self-representation; rather, it must be viewed in 
the context of the trial as a whole. See United States v. Mills, 
895 F.2d 897, 904–05 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, Ottaviano 
participated in the full range of trial activities by delivering an 
opening statement, conducting direct and redirect 
examinations of his own witnesses, cross-examining the 
Government‘s witnesses, making objections, and giving a 
closing argument. Ottaviano also addressed the District Court 
at every conference that occurred while the jury was present. 
Viewed in the context of the trial, Ottaviano‘s Sixth 
Amendment right to represent himself was not infringed.  
Nor did Ottaviano‘s exclusion from the courtroom 
deny him the right to be present ―at any stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure.‖ Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). We review this claim—
which derives from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as 
articulated in Fed. R. Crim. P. 43—for harmless error. United 
States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2003). Ottaviano 
fails to point to anything that would have happened 
differently had he been present at the conference, or to any 
legitimate reason why a ―fair and just hearing [was] thwarted 
by his absence.‖ United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, 
Ottaviano‘s exclusion was likely not erroneous. And even if it 
was, it was harmless error insofar as the District Court 
admitted the evidence that gave rise to the dispute.
 4
  
                                                 
4
 Ottaviano also raises two other issues on appeal, 
neither of which is persuasive. First, the District Court did not 
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IV 
In sum, the Government presented overwhelming 
evidence of Ottaviano‘s guilt at a lengthy trial, the great 
majority of which was conducted fairly and properly. 
Viewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that Ottaviano 
received an unconstitutional trial. Accordingly, we will affirm 
his judgment of conviction. 
                                                                                                             
constructively amend the indictment in its charge to the jury 
such that the Government was excused from having to prove 
that PTOs and BIC were illegal. See Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 
531–32. Ottaviano was clearly convicted of the same offenses 
charged in the indictment. Second, Ottaviano‘s argument that 
the District Court‘s delay in ordering restitution divested it of 
the authority to order restitution at all is foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Dolan v. United States. 130 S. 
Ct. 2533 (2010). Dolan held that the federal restitution 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), does not divest the District 
Court of the authority to order restitution in situations such as 
this one, where the sentencing court made clear prior to the 
deadline‘s expiration that it would order restitution and the 
defendant did not ask the court to grant a timely hearing 
within the 90-day window. Id. at 2537, 2539–42. 
 
